We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009) . In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budgetbalanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex post efficient decision rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.
Introduction
Since the "Wilson doctrine" (Wilson, 1987) , much emphasis has been placed on the design of "detail free" mechanisms that do not rely excessively on common knowledge assumptions about the environment for which they are intended. In particular, the main objective is to avoid the assumption that agents' beliefs about each other are common knowledge. As one way of responding to Wilson's critique, the literature has revisited canonical mechanism design problems such as auctions, bilateral trade, and the provision of a public good (see, e.g., Börgers, 2006 , Chung and Ely, 2006 , Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992 , offering characterizations of either ex post incentive compatible or dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms, for which assumptions about the agents' beliefs are superfluous. 1 The present paper contributes to this literature by focusing on dominant strategy implementation in the compromise model of Börgers and Postl (2009) 
The question of what shape strategy-proof decision rules take in this model is of broader interest because of its close formal connection with canonical models of mechanism design for public good provision. While formally without transferable utility, the compromise setting is essentially a public good model with two agents who "pay" for a given probability of obtaining a compromise outcome (i.e. the public good) by surrendering probability of their respective favorite alternatives. The fact that the transferable resource is probability mass gives rise to individual liquidity constraints that impose additional restrictions on the agents' payments towards the public good over and above those needed to ensure "budget balance". 2 A second difference between the public good model and the compromise model is that in the latter, agents cannot opt out of the mechanism.
In the literature, existing characterizations of strategy-proof budget-balanced public good provision mechanisms with voluntary participation have so far been restricted to deterministic mechanisms that specify, on the basis of the participants' stated preferences, whether or not the public good will be provided (see Chung and Ely, 2006 , who allow for the possibility of interdependent valuations, and Börgers, 2006, who provides a characterization for two agents with private valuations). In the compromise setting, where a mechanism is a cardinal probabilistic decision rule, a restriction to deterministic mechanisms seems less natural than in the public good setup. By studying strategy-proof decision rules in the compromise 1 There are alternative responses to the Wilson doctrine that do not involve a strengthening of the implementation concept as a way of dispensing with the need for specifying agents' beliefs about each other. Examples include Bergemann and Morris (2005) , Chung and Ely (2007) , and Smith (2010) .
2 Budget balance in the compromise model refers to the requirement that the probabilities assigned by the mechanism to the various possible outcomes must sum up to 1. m odel, we would like to make a first step towards a characterization of strategyproof budget-balanced and ex post individually rational probabilistic public good provision mechanisms.
We make two main contributions in this paper. The first is a characterization of the set of strategy-proof decision rules in the compromise model. While this characterization builds on what are now standard methods in mechanism design theory (such as the integral form envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal, 2002) , we go beyond the established payoff equivalence result (see Holmstrom's Lemma in Milgrom, 2004) by explicitly accounting for the fact that decision rules are probability distributions over the set of social alternatives. In terms of the public good analogy, this means that we incorporate the ex post budget balance constraints directly into the characterization of strategy-proof public good provision mechanisms. What is particularly interesting is that any strategy-proof mechanism involves "payments" by the agents that automatically satisfy the individual liquidity constraints. In other words, with dominant strategy implementation, the key distinguishing feature of the compromise model (i.e. the agents' liquidity constraints) ceases to play a role, and consequently the set of strategy-proof decision rules is identical to the set of budget-balanced provision mechanisms in the corresponding public good model.
The key component of any strategy-proof decision rule is the function which, based on the agents' stated preferences, determines the probability of the compromise. The analogue of this function in the public good model is the so called public good provision rule, which determines the probability of public good provision. Our characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms in the compromise model implies restrictions on the shape of admissible public good provision rules in the public good model. These restrictions go further than the monotonicity requirement that usually characterizes strategy-proof mechanisms in the literature (see, e.g., Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992) . However, providing a sharp characterization of all admissible provision rules remains a difficult problem in general. For the class of deterministic mechanisms, we are able to provide a complete description of the set of strategyproof and budget-balanced provision rules. For probabilistic mechanisms, however, it is decidedly more difficult to obtain such a characterization. For the class of twice continuously differentiable provision rules, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for strategy-proofness is additivity. I.e. the provision rule is the sum of two functions, each of which depends solely on the valuation of one agent. 3 In order to move beyond continuously differentiable provision rules, we consider a 3 Our work in this part of the paper is related to the small literature on strategy-proof cardinal probabilistic decision rules due to Gibbard (1977) , Freixas (1984) , and Barberà et al. (1998) . I am indebted to Arunava Sen for drawing my attention to this literature. Note that all these papers predate the development of envelope theorems for functions that are not everywhere continuously differentiable (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) . The approach in Freixas (1984) , when applied to our special class of piecewise differentiable rules. While (piecewise) additivity remains necessary, we show that sufficiency requires any admissible provision rule to satisfy additional conditions that restrict the rule's behavior at points of discontinuity.
Our second main contribution in this paper is to show that an ex post efficient decision rule (as defined by Holmström and Myerson, 1983 ) is strategy-proof if and only if it always selects the favorite alternative of the same agent. Against the backdrop of "dictatorship" results in the classical literature on dominant strategy implementation of efficient decision rules (see, e.g., Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 , or Aswal et al., 2003 , this result may not sound surprising. However, it is important to emphasize that our result is neither a consequence of this literature (which considers only deterministic social choice rules), nor of the literature on strategy-proof implementation of probabilistic social choice rules. 4 Despite the impossibility result in Börgers and Postl, which shows that no ex ante incentive efficient decision rules exist under Bayesian implementation, it is not clear a priori that there are no strategy-proof ex post efficient decision rules here. The reason is that while strategy-proofness on one hand is a more restrictive implementation concept than Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex post efficiency on the other hand is a much weaker efficiency notion than ex ante efficiency. 5 It should therefore come as no surprise that any given strategy-proof deterministic mechanism can be rendered ex post constrained efficient, as we illustrate with examples at the end of the paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model and basic definitions. Section 3 contains our characterization of the set of strategy-proof decision rules. In Section 4, we characterize (in the terminology of the public good model) all deterministic strategy-proof and budget-balanced public good provision rules. Section 5 contains our results for dominant strategy implementation of probabilistic mechanisms. In Section 6, we study ex post efficient decision rules. Section 7 offers a brief conclusion. The appendix in Section 8 contains all longer proofs.
setup, rules out all but constant mechanisms. The focus in Barberà et al. (1998) is on continuous and on twice continuously differentiable rules. 4 In Gibbard (1977) , preference intensities are not considered. While studying cardinal decision rules that take account of preference intensities, Dutta et al. (2007) assume a universal preference domain. The compromise model, in contrast, features a very restrictive preference domain with only one ordinal ranking per agent. 5 In fact, Wilson (1993) points out: "Ex post efficiency is rarely invoked because it is a very weak criterion [...] ." 2 The ModelT wo agents i ∈ I := {1,2} must choose one alternative from the set A := {a 0 ,a 1 ,a 2 }. Each agent i prefers alternative a i over alternative a 0 , and alternative a 0 over alternative a −i (subscript −i refers to the agent other than i). These ordinal preferences are common knowledge. We refer to alternative a 0 as the compromise because it is the middle-ranked alternative of both agents. Agent i's von Neumann Morgenstern utility function is u i : A → R. Utilities are normalized so that u i (a i ) = 1 and u i (a −i ) = 0 for all i ∈ I. These aspects of the von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions are common knowledge. For each agent i ∈ I denote by t i the utility of the compromise u i (a 0 ). We refer to t i ∈ [0,1] as agent i's type. Each agent observes his own type, but not that of the other agent. Define by t := (t 1 ,t 2 ) a generic type-pair in T :
Definition 1 A decision rule is a function f : T → ∆(A), where ∆(A) is the set of all probability distributions over A.
Denote by f i (t) the probability that decision rule f assigns to agent i's favorite alternative when the type-pair is t, and let f 0 (t) denote the probability that f assigns to the compromise. For a decision rule f and type-pair t, agent i's expected utility is u i (t|t i ) := f i (t) + f 0 (t)t i . As the agents' types are privately observed, only incentive compatible decision rules can be implemented. We focus here on implementation of truth-telling in dominant strategies.
Definition 2 A decision rule f is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I, all t i ,t i ∈ [0,1], and all t −i ∈ [0,1]:
As shown in Borgers and Postl (2009) , the above compromise model can be re-interpreted as a model of mechanism design for the provision of a public good. By introducing a default outcome in which agent i's favorite alternative is selected with probability δ i ∈ [0,1] (for each i ∈ I, with δ 1 + δ 2 = 1), we can view the difference δ i − f i (t) as agent i's "payment" towards a public good (i.e. the compromise) when the type-pair is t. The definition of decision rules above implies individual liquidity constraints for the agents, which arise because the probability of each agent's favorite alternative is a number between 0 and 1. Agent i's "payment" towards the public good must therefore be a number in
It is customary in the public goods context to assume that agents are free to opt out of any proposed mechanism. If we allow for this in the modified compromise setup, then the following individual rationality constraints have to be taken into account:
Definition 3 A decision rule is ex post individually rational if: f i (t) + f 0 (t)t i ≥ δ i for all t ∈ T and all i ∈ I.
Strategy-Proof Decision Rules
In this section, we investigate the structure of the set of strategy-proof decision rules. Lemma 1 below adapts to our setting the characterization of strategy-proofness that is familiar from the mechanism design literature on quasilinear environments with transferable utility. 6 Lemma 1 A decision rule f is strategy-proof if and only if: (i) For all i ∈ I and all t ∈ T : f 0 (t) is nondecreasing in t i .
(ii) For every i ∈ I and every t ∈ T :
Lemma 1 highlights the central role played by the probability of the compromise in the characterization of strategy-proof decision rules. In particular, item (ii) of Lemma 1 tells us that the probability of an agent's favorite alternative (and therefore his "payment") is determined by the probability of the compromise, up to an additive term f i (1,t −i ) + f 0 (1,t −i ) that is independent of the agent's own type and therefore does not affect his incentives.
Observe that Lemma 1 is derived without making use of the fact that decision rules, as introduced in Definition 1, are probability distributions whose components sum up to 1 for all type-pairs. Lemma 1 is therefore of limited use when it comes to constructing strategy-proof decision rules because it does not sufficiently restrict the class of functions f 0 that can be part of a strategy-proof rule. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 1 Consider the function f 0 with f 0 (t) = 1 if t 1 +t 2 > 1, and f 0 (t) = 0 if t 1 +t 2 < 1. This function is nondecreasing as required by item (i) of Lemma 1, but cannot be part of a strategy-proof decision rule. To see this, note that by item (ii) of Lemma 1, the probability of each agent's favorite alternative is: 7
(1)
Fo r any type-pair t such that (s.t.) t 1 + t 2 > 1 we have f 0 (t) = 1, and therefore f i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ I. Thus, by equation (1):
This, however, leads to a contradiction: for any t s.t. t 1 +t 2 < 1 we obtain f 0 (t)+ f 1 (t)+ f 2 (t) = 2 −t 1 −t 2 > 1. 8 Example 1 highlights the need for explicit restrictions on functions f 0 that can be part of a strategy-proof decision rule. In order to derive such restrictions, we now account explicitly for the requirement that the functions f 0 , f 1 and f 2 that together constitute a decision rule, must sum up to 1 for all type-pairs. This yields the following characterization of strategy-proof decision rules that goes beyond existing characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms in the literature (such as the one for the canonical public good model in Borgers, 2006) .
is a strategy-proof decision rule if and only if: (i) Fo r all i ∈ I and all t ∈ T: f 0 (t) is nondecreasing in t i .
(ii) Fo r all i ∈ I and all t ∈ T:
The two expressions for f i obtained from item (ii) in Lemma 1, one for type-pairs t such that t 1 +t 2 < 1, and the other for type-pairs t such that t 1 +t 2 > 1, can easily be gathered into the single expression in (1). 8 The function f 0 in Example 1, coupled with functions f i given by (1) with f i (1,t −i ) = 0 for all t −i ∈ [0,1] and all i ∈ I, constitutes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism used in the proof of the main impossibility result in Borgers and Postl (2009). (iii) For all t ∈ T :
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. If the compromise model is given the public good interpretation mentioned in Section 2, then Proposition 1 provides a characterization of strategy-proof public good provision mechanisms that are ex post budget-balanced and satisfy the agents' individual liquidity constraints.
In order to convey some insight into the derivation of Proposition 1, observe that the additive term f i (1,t −i ) + f 0 (1,t −i ) in item (ii) of Lemma 1 not only represents agent i's utility from the decision rule when he has the highest type 1, but also represents the probability that agent i's least preferred alternative is not chosen. We can therefore equivalently write the additive term
is itself determined by item (ii) of Lemma 1, we obtain the expressions for the probability of each agent's favorite alternative given in item (ii) of Proposition 1. 9 The requirement that the functions f 1 and f 2 in item (ii), together with the function f 0 , must sum up to one for all type-pairs then yields item (iii) of Proposition 1. It is this item that furnishes the desired restriction on functions f 0 that can be part of a strategy-proof decision rule.
While item (iii) of Proposition 1 allows us to check if a given nondecreasing function f 0 can be part of a strategy-proof decision rule, it would be useful to know the full class of functions f 0 for which this is the case. More precisely, we would like to have a characterization of all nondecreasing functions f 0 that satisfy item (iii) of Proposition 1. Henceforth, we shall call such functions admissible:
While it is difficult in general to obtain a full characterization of all admissible functions f 0 , it is easy to see that the following condition is sufficient:
] is a nondecreasing function, then f 0 is admissible.
9 The proof of Proposition 1 also shows that the probabilities of the agents' favorite alternatives in item (ii) of Proposition 1 always take values in [0, 1]. P roof. The monotonicity of the functions f i 0 (∀i ∈ I) implies that f 0 satisfies item (i) of Proposition 1. This, in turn, ensures that f 0 is Riemann integrable, and therefore the integrals in items (ii) and (iii) are well-defined. Additivity of f 0 implies for all i ∈ I and all t i ,t i ,
It is now straightforward to verify that item (iii) of Proposition 1 is satisfied.
In order to explore which functions f 0 are admissible when we move beyond additivity, we study in the next section a specific class of functions that has received particular attention in the literature on public good provision mechanisms (see, e.g., Ely, 2006, and Borgers, 2006) .
Binary Decision Rules
In this section we focus on binary decision rules where, conditional on the agents' types, the probability of the compromise is either 0 or 1. Binary decision rules in our setting correspond to deterministic provision mechanisms in the public good setting with quasilinear preferences and transferable utility.
Definition 5 A decision rule f is a binary decision rule if f 0 : T → {0,1}.
In Proposition 3 below, we provide a full characterization of all admissible binary functions f 0 . For each such function, we also state the probabilities f 1 and f 2 of the agents' favorite alternatives that render the binary decision rule ( f 0 , f 1 , f 2 ) strategy-proof.
Proposition 3 A binary decision rule is strategy-proof if and only if it belongs to one of the following three categories: 10 I. Binary decision rules that depend on neither agent's type:
(ii) f 0 (t) = 0 and f 1 (t) = a ∀t ∈ T and any a ∈ [0,1].
II. Binary decision rules that depend on one agent's type:
There is an agent i ∈ I and a threshold
f 0 (t) = 0 and f i (t) = τ i if t i < τ i , f 0 (t) = 1 and f i (t) = 0 if t i ≥τ i .
III. Binary decision rules that depend on both agents' types:
f 0 (t) = 0 and f 1 (t) = τ 1 if t 1 < τ 1 ∧ t 2 < τ 2 , f 0 (t) = 1 and f 1 (t) = 0 otherwise.
(ii) There are thresholds
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. It uses item (iii) of Proposition 1 extensively to characterize admissible binary functions f 0 . The key step in the proof is to note that if there are thresholds τ i , τ i ∈ (0, 1) and types t −i and
, then the thresholds must be the same:
To see this, observe that for t −i (t −i , resp.) the probability of i's favorite alternative must be equal to the threshold τ i (τ i , resp.) whenever the compromise is not chosen. This is to ensure that agent i with a type below the threshold has no incentive to pretend his type is above the threshold, and vice versa. Now consider a typet i < min{τ i , τ i }. We have f 0 (t i ,t −i ) = 0 and f −i (t i ,t −i ) = 1 − τ i , as well as f 0 (t i ,t −i ) = 0 and f −i (t i ,t −i ) = 1 − τ i . In order to ensure that both types t −i and t −i of the other agent report truthfully, it must hold that τ i = τ i . Given this observation, it is intuitive that admissible binary functions f 0 can only display the shapes in Proposition 3.
To conclude this section, we re-interpret the compromise model as a public good model and impose individual rationality constraints. It is easy to obtain from Proposition 3 the following result:
Corollary 1 A binary decision rule is strategy-proof and ex post individually rational if and only if it belongs to one of the following categories in Proposition 3: Category I.(ii) with f i (t) = δ i for all i ∈ I, and Category III.(ii) with τ i = δ i for all i ∈ I.
The proof is in the Appendix. The set of individually rational and strategyproof binary decision rules characterized in Corollary 1 corresponds to the set of strategy-proof ex post individually rational and ex post budget balanced deterministic provision mechanisms characterized by Chung and Ely (2006) , and by Börgers (2006) , for the canonical public good setup. The fact that these mechanisms are a strict subset of those in Proposition 3 illustrates, as pointed out in the introduction, that individual liquidity constraints are not binding in the public good variant of our model, where participation constraints must be respected. Note that this is the case not just with deterministic mechanisms, but holds for all public good provision rules when dominant strategy implementation is used.
Some Results for Non-Binary Decision Rules
We have shown in Proposition 2 that additivity is a sufficient condition for a function f 0 to be admissible. However, it is obvious from the previous section on binary decision rules that additivity is not necessary. The reason is that binary rules feature piecewise-constant functions f 0 that cannot be described as the sum of two univariate functions.
The task of characterizing all functions f 0 : T → [0,1] that satisfy item (iii) of Proposition 1 is a difficult problem in general. As a first step towards such a characterization, we derive here a necessary condition for a function f 0 to be admissible by adopting a differential approach. 11 If this appears restrictive, note that monotonicity of f 0 (as required by item (i) of Proposition 1) ensures the existence almost everywhere (a.e.) of the first-order partial derivatives ∂ f 0 (t)/∂t i of f 0 . However, it would be remiss not to emphasize that our necessary condition below relies on an additional smoothness assumption. In particular, we assume that the partial derivatives ∂ f 0 (t i ,·)/∂t i of f 0 are absolutely continuous. This assumption guarantees the existence a.e. of the cross partial derivatives ∂ 2 f 0 (t)/∂t i ∂t j of f 0 . Given this assumption, we can show the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose f 0 is nondecreasing. Suppose also that for all i ∈ I the partial derivative ∂ f 0 (t i ,·)/∂t i is an absolutely continuous function for every t i where it exists. If f 0 satisfies item (iii) of Proposition 1, then for all i ∈ I and almost all t i ,
It is easy to show that any continuously differentiable function f 0 that satisfies condition (2) in Proposition 4 must be additive. To see this, assume that the partial derivatives ∂ f 0 (t)/∂t i exist everywhere and are continuous. Set t −i = 1 and integrate both sides of (2) from t i up to 1. This yields the following additive function:
It follows directly from Proposition 2 that the function f 0 in (3) is admissible. 12 Thus, for the class of continuously differentiable nondecreasing functions, condition (2) in Proposition 4 is both necessary and sufficient for f 0 to be admissible. 13 Obviously, limiting ourselves to continuously differentiable functions f 0 is too restrictive. However, it is difficult to establish in general a sufficient condition for strategy-proofness once we move outside this class. To see why, note that while a nondecreasing function f 0 (·,t −i ) (for given t −i ∈ [0, 1]) can display only countably many jump-discontinuities, there may nevertheless be a large number of jumps in the value of f 0 . 14 We therefore consider a very limited departure from the class of continuously differentiable functions in order to explore what conditions beyond the one in Proposition 4 are needed to make a discontinuous function f 0 admissible. The particular class of functions we study now has been chosen because it includes the piecewise constant step functions f 0 that are associated with the strategy-proof binary decision rules in Proposition 3. 
Now consider a function f 0 in F and suppose that it satisfies the necessary condition (2) in Proposition 4. We can then show that f 0 must be piecewise additive:
12 Barberà et al. (1998) , who study the design of cardinal probabilistic decision rules, have a result which implies that twice continuously differentiable rules are additive. However, their results are limited to either continuous or twice continuously differentiable decision rules. 13 While we omit for the sake of brevity a formal statement and proof, it is possible to show that in the presence of participation constraints, any additive public good provision rule f 0 is "degenerate": It provides the public good with probability zero for all type-pairs t ∈ [0, 1) 2 , and consists of the sum of functions f i 0 (for every i ∈ I) such that f i 0 (t i ) = 0 if t i < 1, and
. This finding suggests that the focus on deterministic mechanisms in the literature may not be overly restrictive.
14 For a definition of jump discontinuity, see e.g. Definition 4.49 in Apostol (1974) . 15 We denote by f
, resp.) the left-hand (right-hand, resp.) limit of f 0 att i . I.e.
Lemma 2 If a function f 0 in F satisfies condition (2) in Proposition 4 then:
The proof is in the Appendix. The additive term k in Lemma 2 represents the difference in the size of the jump in f 0 at the boundary point (τ i ,1), and at an interior point (τ i ,t −i ). The fact that this difference in jump-size must be constant for all t −i < τ −i restricts the types of functions in F that are admissible. Observe that, in contrast to the continuously differentiable case, condition (2) in Proposition 4 is not sufficient for functions in F to be admissible. The reason is that item (iii) of Proposition 1 implies further restrictions on admissible functions by limiting the types τ i at which jumps in f 0 can occur.
Proposition 5 A function f 0 in F is admissible if and only if it is a piecewise additive function as given in Lemma 2, with k(1 − τ 1 − τ 2 ) = 0.
The proof is omitted as it is straightforward to verify that, for any type-pair t s.t. t i < τ i for all i ∈ I, the piecewise additive function f 0 in (4) satisfies item (iii) of Proposition 1 only if k(1 − τ 1 − τ 2 ) = 0. I.e. if the difference in jump size k is strictly positive, then the types τ 1 and τ 2 at which discontinuities in f 0 may arise must form a point on the cross-diagonal in the unit-square T.
We conclude this section by highlighting the usefulness of Proposition 5 for constructing admissible functions in F from given "boundary functions" f 0 (t 1 ,1) and f 0 (1,t 2 ). For example, we can generate in this way any binary decision rule in Category III.(ii) of Proposition 3. 16 We can also generate strategy-proof rules that are not piecewise constant, as the following example shows:
Example 2 Fo r all i ∈ I, let τ i = 0.5 and fix boundary functions f 0 (t i ,1) s. 
for any i ∈ I and all t −i < τ −i . The function f 0 (t) in Category III.(ii) of Proposition 3 then corresponds to the one we obtain from (4) for k = 1, which is required to ensure that f 0 (t) ∈ [0,1] ∀t ∈ T.
that the function f 0 (t) given by (4) takes values in [0, 1] for all t ∈ T , which is due to the fact that f + 0 (0.5,t −i ) = f − 0 (0.5,t −i ), and therefore k = 0.25:
The associated probabilities f 1 (t) and f 2 (t) that render the decision rule ( f 0 , f 1 , f 2 ) strategy-proof are then obtained from item (ii) of Proposition 1:
Efficient Decision Rules
We have so far studied the characteristics of strategy-proof decision rules, leaving aside the question of which rule should be selected for the purpose of reaching a collective decision. To obtain a criterion for choosing between decision rules, we make recourse to the efficiency notions defined in Holmström and Myerson (1983) . 17 In the spirit of dominant strategy implementation, we want to keep our model belief-free. Therefore, we focus here on ex post efficient decision rules. A decision rule f is said to be ex post efficient if, for given welfare weights λ i : T → R + (for every i ∈ I) that depend arbitrarily on t, the decision rule attains the highest level of social welfare. Social welfare associated with a decision rule f is the aggregate over all t ∈ T of the weighted sum of the agents' ex post utilities:
As pointed out by Holmström and Myerson, ex post efficient decision rules are those that maximize, for every type-pair t ∈ T , the weighted sum of the agents' ex post utilities in the integrand of (5). Using the fact that decision rules are probability distributions over the set of alternatives A, we can write this sum as:
This expression is additive in the probabilities f 0 , f 1 and f 2 , making it is easy to derive properties of decision rules that are welfare-maximizing among all decision 17 Observe that in the compromise model, any decision (i.e. the alternative in A chosen by the decision rule) is Pareto efficient, because for every type-pair t ∈ (0, 1) 2 it is impossible to make one agent better off by switching to a different alternative without making the other agent worse off.
rules. Adopting Holmstrom and Myerson's terminology, we call such decision rules ex post classically efficient.
Definition 7 A decision rule f is ex post classically efficient if and only if for every t ∈ T:
Definition 7 states, for each t ∈ T, which alternatives in A must not be implemented by an ex post classically efficient decision rule. Observe that ex post classical efficiency need not prescribe a unique choice in A, in which case Definition 7 does not constrain the probabilities of any alternatives that have not been ruled out. Consequently, the set of ex post classically efficient decision rules contains both binary rules and non-binary rules.
As the agents' types are privately observed, any ex post classically efficient decision rule can be implemented only if it is strategy-proof. Given the considerable degrees of freedom in the choice of agents' welfare weights, it is interesting to ask if strategy-proof ex post classically efficient decision rules exist. A trivial example is the rule that always selects agent 1's favorite alternative: efficiency follows from the fact that this rule maximizes ex post welfare for every type-pair t ∈ T if agent 2's weight λ 2 (t) = 0 for all t; strategy-proofness of this rule follows from Category I.(ii) of Proposition 3. In order to exclude such cases, and to see if there exist strategyproof ex post classically efficient decision rules that are responsive to the agents' types, we assume in the remainder of this section that agents' welfare weights are strictly positive: λ i (t) > 0 for all t ∈ T and all i ∈ I. Given this assumption, we can provide a sharper characterization of ex post classically efficient decision rules: Lemma 3 Let f be an ex post classically efficient decision rule for some pair of welfare weights λ i : T → R ++ (∀i ∈ I). Then:
For t 1 + t 2 < 1 :
For t 1 + t 2 = 1 :
For t 1 + t 2 > 1 :
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix. Lemma 3 states for each typepair the alternatives that can be assigned positive probability by an ex post classically efficient decision rule. It is obvious from Lemma 3 that none of the strategyproof binary decision rules in Proposition 3 are ex post classically efficient. We now show that even among all non-binary decision rules there is none that is both ex post classically efficient and strategy-proof: Proposition 6 If both agents' welfare weights λ i (·) are strictly positive for all t ∈ T , then there exists no ex post classically efficient and strategy-proof decision rule.
The proof, together with a series of lemmas that it builds on, is in the Appendix. However, the key idea of the proof is conveyed by Fig. 1 . We show that any ex post classically efficient strategy-proof decision rule must have the shape displayed in Fig. 1 . In particular, the compromise is never chosen for type-pairs t s.t. t 1 +t 2 < 1. For any such type-pair, each agent i's favorite alternative receives constant and strictly positive probability¯f i , with¯f 1 +¯f 2 = 1. For all type-pairs t s.t. t i >¯f i for all i, the compromise is selected with probability 1. Finally, for type-pairs t s.t. t i >¯f i and 1 −t i < t −i <¯f −i , the decision rule assigns positive probability to alternatives a 0 and a −i only. Now fix a typet 2 <¯f 2 . In the proof of Proposition 6 we establish, for all t 1 > 1 −t 2 , that the probability of the compromise f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) is a number in (0,1). Next, fix some typet 1 > 1 −t 2 and consider agent 2 of typet 2 , with¯f 2 <t 2 < 1. Truthful revelation of his type gives agent 2 a utility oft 2 because the compromise is selected with probability 1. A report oft 2 <¯f 2 will instead give agent 2 a utility of f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) + f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )t 2 = 1 − f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )(1−t 2 ). This follows from the fact that att, the decision rule assigns positive probability to a 0 and a 2 only. Incentive compatibility therefore requires that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1. This, however, leads to a contradiction because there are types t 1 ∈ (¯f 1 ,1−t 2 ) who would prefer to claim that their type ist 1 > 1 −t 2 in order to get the compromise for sure, rather than obtain their favorite alternative with probability¯f 1 when reporting their true type.
It is important to reiterate that Proposition 6 is not a special case of the literature on the impossibility of implementing non-dictatorial cardinal and ex post efficient social choice rules. Furthermore, despite the formal similarity between the compromise model and canonical mechanism design models with transferable utility and quasi-linear preferences (such as Green and Laffont, 1979) , Proposition 6 cannot be established by arguing that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are the only ex post classically efficient and strategy-proof decision rules, but that they cannot serve as decision rules here because their components f 0 , f 1 and f 2 do not sum up to 1 for all type-pairs. The reason we cannot construct the proof of Proposition 6 along these lines is that VCG mechanisms exist only in the special case where the agents have the same weights in the social welfare function. 18 In all other cases, we cannot maximize social welfare by choosing the function f 0 independently from the functions f 1 and f 2 .
As there are no non-trivial ex post classically efficient decision rules that are strategy-proof, one may ask which, among all strategy-proof decision rules, maximize social welfare in (5) for some pair of weights (λ 1 (·),λ 2 (·)). We call such decision rules ex post incentive efficient. 19 In the absence of a full characterization 18 See Example 1 in Section 3 above, esp. footnote 8. 19 Clearly, the need to ensure incentive compatibility of the chosen rule will result in distortions relative to ex post classical efficiency. I.e. there will be type-pairs t ∈ T for which the decision rule fails to maximize the weighted sum of the agents' utilities. An ex post incentive efficient decision rule therefore is one which yields the smallest aggregate distortion across all type-pairs t, in comparison with all other strategy-proof rules. of all functions f 0 that can be part of a strategy-proof decision rule, we restrict attention to binary rules. Given the vast degrees of freedom in the choice of welfare weights λ i (·) it is not surprising that there are many ex post incentive efficient binary decision rules. In fact, as the following example shows, each category of non-trivial strategy-proof binary rules in Proposition 3 (i.e. Categories II and III) contains at least one rule that is ex post incentive efficient.
Example 3 For weights λ 1 (t) = λ 2 (t) = 4t 1 t 2 , the welfare-maximizing strategyproof binary decision rule is as shown in Category III.(i) of Proposition 3, with τ 1 = τ 2 = 0.5. For weights λ 1 (t) = λ 2 (t) = 4(1−t 1 )(1−t 2 ), the welfare-maximizing strategy-proof binary decision rule is as shown in Category III.(ii) of Proposition 3, with τ 1 = τ 2 = 0.5. For weights λ 1 (t) = λ 2 (t) = 1 for all t ∈ T , the following strategy-proof binary decision rules in Proposition 3 maximize social welfare: Category II with τ i = 0.5 for any i ∈ I, III.(i) with τ 1 = τ 2 = 0.5, and Category III.(ii) with τ 1 = τ 2 = 0.5.
In order to obtain a stronger selection criterion, we could turn to the notion of ex ante incentive efficiency (see Holmström and Myerson, 1983) . This, however, would require us to assume that the mechanism designer has a well-defined subjective probability distribution that represents his beliefs about the agents' types. As pointed out by Chung and Ely (2007) , such an assumption would introduce an asymmetry into the model: By using strategy-proof (rather than Bayesian incentive compatible) decision rules, the mechanism designer avoids completely the need to make assumptions regarding the agents' beliefs about each others' types. However, a reluctance to formulate any view regarding the agents' beliefs about each other seems at odds with a precisely held subjective belief about the agents' types themselves. 20 We therefore do not pursue this issue further here. 21 
Conclusion
Adopting strategy-proofness as our implementation concept, we have taken a unified approach to the compromise model of Börgers and Postl (2009) and the closely related canonical public good model. We have shown that strategy-proof decision 20 Chung and Ely (2007) provide a foundation for using strategy-proof mechanisms in the context of optimal auction design. 21 For a prior-free approach to efficient mechanisms in the closely related public good model, see Smith (2010). rules that are smooth, and those that fall into a special class of discontinuous mechanisms (which includes the deterministic mechanisms widely studied in the literature), must be (piecewise) additive. However, for strategy-proofness, any piecewise additive decision rule that displays jump-discontinuities must satisfy further conditions that limit the location and magnitude of these jumps. In future work, it would be interesting to see how many jump-discontinuities a strategy-proof decision rule can support, and to what extent such rules allow us to approximate more closely ex post efficient rules. Regarding the question of which ex post efficient rules are strategy-proof, we have proved a "dictatorship result" that, while familiar in spirit, is not the consequence of any known dictatorship result in the literature. An interesting open question is the extent to which universal preference domain assumptions in this literature can be weakened while still sustaining dictatorship as the only way of implementing an ex post efficient cardinal probabilistic decision rule.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Item (i) is the same as item (i) in Lemma 1. As the proof is familiar from the literature it is omitted here. In what follows, we explicitly derive the expressions in items (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1.
Item (ii). We show that the additive term f i (1,t −i )+ f 0 (1,t −i ) in item (ii) of Lemma 1 can be expressed solely in terms of the function f 0 and constants f i (1,1). To see this, suppose that f is an incentive compatible decision rule, so that the probabilities f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) and f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) of alternatives a 1 and a 2 , resp., are given by item (ii) of Lemma 1. As the probabilities f 1 , f 2 and f 0 together sum up to 1 for every type-pair we obtain:
For t 1 = 1 equation (6) reduces to:
Solving equation (7) for f 1 (1,t 2 ) yields:
As the probabilities f 0 , f 1 and f 2 sum up to 1 at every (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 we have f 1 (1, 1) = 1 − f 0 (1, 1) − f 2 (1, 1). We can therefore write equation (8) as:
Substituting the expression for f 1 (1,t 2 ) in (9) into the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative in item (ii) of Lemma 1 we obtain:
Equation (10) is the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative in item (ii) of Proposition 1. In the same way we can derive the probability of agent 2's favorite alternative. We now show that the functions f i in item (ii) of Proposition 1 only take values in [0, 1] for every (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 . For this purpose, consider the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative in (10). Fix a value of t 2 and consider the behavior of f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) as a function of t 1 . The partial derivative w.r.t. t 1 is:
Monotonicity of f 0 implies that f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) is nonincreasing for all t 1 ∈ [0, 1]. We therefore only have to show that for any monotone function f 0 and all t 2 ∈ [0, 1] it holds that f 1 (1,t 2 ) is nonnegative and that f 1 (0,t 2 ) is no larger than 1. To show that this is true, fix some value for f 0 (1,t 2 ) and consider the term:
which is part of the expression for the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative in (10). We now ask how the choice of function f 0 affects the magnitude of (11). First note that for a fixed value of t 2 , the minimum of (11) is attained by setting f 0 (1, s) = f 0 (1,t 2 ) for all s > t 2 . This yields:
Now obtain from (10) the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative at the point (1,t 2 ), making use of the expression in (12). Denoting the resulting function by f min 1 (1,t 2 ), we obtain:
Equation (13) shows that, for all t 2 ∈ [0, 1], f min 1 (1,t 2 ) is equal to the given constant f 1 (1, 1) . This implies that f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≥ f 1 (1, 1) ≥ 0 for all (t 1 ,t 2 ), as required.
Observe that for a fixed value of t 2 , the maximum of (11) is attained by setting f 0 (1,s) = f 0 (1,1) for all s > t 2 . This yields:
Now obtain from (10) the probability of agent 1's favorite alternative at the point (0,t 2 ), making use of the expression in (14) . Denoting the resulting function by f max 1 (0,t 2 ), we obtain:
Equation (15) shows that f max 1 (0,t 2 ) takes a value smaller than 1 for all t 2 ∈ [0,1]. This implies f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 )≤1 for all (t 1 ,t 2 ), as required.
Item (iii). The result is obtained by substituting the expressions for f 1 (1,t 2 ) in (9) and the corresponding expression for f 2 (t 1 ,1) into equation (6). Noting that f 1 (1,1) + f 2 (1,1) = 1 − f 0 (1,1) we obtain:
which can easily be rearranged to yield item (iii) in Proposition 1.
We now prepare the ground for the proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to verify that the binary decision rules in Proposition 3 are strategy-proof. We therefore only prove necessity here by deriving restrictions that item (iii) of Proposition 1 imposes on admissible functions f 0 . A key building block in the proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Lemma A.1 below:
Lemma A.1 If there are two type-pairs (t 1 ,t 2 ) and (t 1 ,t 2 ) in the interior of the unit square T with 0 < t 1 < t 1 < 1 and 0
The function f 0 in case (i) of Lemma A.1 is illustrated in the left-hand panel of Fig. 2 , while the f 0 in case (ii) is shown in the right-hand panel of Fig. 2. 
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. Then, at (t 1 ,t 2 ) item (iii) of Proposition 1 reduces to:
Note that types t * 1 ∈ (t 1 ,t 1 ] and t * 2 ∈ (t 2 ,t 2 ] s.t. t * 1 +t * 2 = 1 exist only if:
The above necessary condition that t 1 + t 2 ≥ 1 ensures that there exists a value t * 1 s.t. t * 1 + t 2 < 1. In order to ensure that there also exists a t * 2 = 1 − t * 1 s.t. 1 ≤ t * 1 + t 2 it must be that case that the lower bound on t * 1 (namely t 1 ) is s.t. t 1 + t 2 < 1. This gives rise to Case (ii) in Lemma A.1. Case 1. Consider types t 1 ,t * 1 and t 2 with 0 < t 1 < t * 1 < 1 and 0 < t 2 < 1. Now suppose that f 0 is of the form displayed in the right-hand panel of Fig. 2 . Suppose f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0. Now pick anyt 1 with 0≤t 1 < t 1 . Monotonicity of f 0 implies f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0. At (t 1 ,t 2 ) item (iii) of Proposition 1 reduces to:
The left-hand side of (18) is strictly positive. Thus, there must be a threshold s * > t 2 s.t. f 0 (t 1 ,s) = 0 if s < s * and f 0 (t 1 ,s) = 1 if s≥s * . Therefore (18) implies:
Employing the same logic we can show for any type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) with 0≤t 2 < t 2 that f 0 (s,t 2 ) = 0 for all s < t * 1 and f 0 (s,t 2 ) = 1 for all s≥t * 1 . Thus, if f 0 is as shown in the right-hand panel of Fig. 2 and f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0, then f 0 is as described in Category III.(i) of Proposition 1 with τ 1 = t * 1 . Case 2. Consider a type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) and suppose that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 (see left-hand panel of Fig. 2 for an illustration, but note that we do not, at this point, make any assumptions about whether t 1 +t 2 < 1, t 1 +t 2 = 1, or t 1 +t 2 > 1). Now suppose that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0 for all t 1 < t 1 (the case where f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0 for all t 2 < t 2 is analogous to what follows and is therefore omitted). Pick any type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) with 0≤t 1 < t 1 and 0≤t 2 < t 2 . At (t 1 ,t 2 ) it therefore holds that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0. At (t 1 ,t 2 ) item (iii) of Proposition 1 reduces to:
Such a type s * of agent 2 exists only ift 2 < 1 −t 1 ≤t 2 . In this case it follows that f 0 (1,1−t 1 ) = 1. As we also have f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 (by the opening assumption in Case
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(ii) of Proposition 1 with τ 1 = t 1 . Case 2.ii. Now suppose there exists a type s * ∈ [t 1 , 1) s.t. f 0 (s,t 2 ) = 0 for all s < s * and f 0 (s,t 2 ) = 1 for all s ≥ s * . Then (19) reduces to:
This shows that for types t 1 and t 2 s.t. t 1 + t 2 < 1 it follows that f 0 must be as described in Category II. of Proposition 1 with τ 1 = t 1 .
Proof of Corollary 1. It is easy to see that decision rules in Categories I.(ii) and III.(ii) of Proposition 3 are individually rational for appropriately chosen thresholds/probabilities of the agents' favorite alternatives. However, decision rules in Category I.(i) violate ex post rationality as for each i ∈ I, any type t i < δ i has strictly lower utility from the decision rule than in the default outcome. Next note that decision rules in Category II violate ex post individual rationality: Consider a decision rule where f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 for all (t 1 ,t 2 ) s.t. t 1 > τ 1 . Then for any (t 1 ,t 2 ) s.t. t 1 > τ 1 and t 2 < δ 2 it holds that agent 2's utility is t 2 , which is strictly lower than in the default outcome. Finally, decision rules in Category III.(i) violate ex post individual rationality: Consider any (t 1 ,t 2 ) s.t. t 1 < min{τ 1 , δ 1 } and t 2 > τ 2 . In this case, f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 and agent 1's utility is t 1 , which is strictly lower than in the default outcome.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose f 0 satisfies item (i) of Proposition 1. Suppose also that the cross partial derivatives ∂ 2 f 0 (t i ,t −i )/∂t i ∂t −i exist for almost all t −i ∈ [0, 1] (for all i ∈ I). Now take any type-pair t ∈ (0, 1) 2 at which the partial derivatives and cross partial derivatives of f 0 exist. Suppose also that the partial derivatives ∂ f 0 (t 1 , 1)/∂t 1 and ∂ f 0 (1,t 2 )/∂t 2 exist. Differentiating both sides of the equation in item (iii) of Proposition 1 with respect to t 1 yields:
Differentiating both sides of this equation with respect to t 2 yields:
This shows that for any given type t 1 , we must have ∂ 2 f 0 (t 1 , s 2 )/∂t 1 ∂t 2 = 0 for all s 2 s.t. t 1 + s 2 = 1. Now pick any two types t 2 < t 2 s.t. t 1 + t 2 = 1 and t 1 + t 2 = 1.
Combining these two inequalities, we can write:
This, however, constitutes a contradiction. It is therefore not efficient to implement the compromise for any type-pair below the cross-diagonal. Now suppose that the type-pair t is on or above the cross-diagonal in T: t 1 +t 2 ≥1.
For any agent i with t i < 1 we obtain from (23) an upper bound on i's welfare weight λ i (t):
For any agent i with t i = 1, there is no upper bound on the value of his welfare weight λ i (t). However, regardless of whether t i < 1 or t i = 1 (i ∈ I) we can always find a pair of welfare weights λ 1 (t) and λ 2 (t) s.t. -where applicable -the upper bounds implied by (23) are respected. In summary, an ex post classically efficient decision rule f may implement the compromise with probability 1 for any type-pair t on or above the cross-diagonal. Case 5. S = {a i } for some i ∈ I: f i (t) = 1. Efficiency requires that ex post welfare under agent i's favorite alternative exceeds welfare under both the compromise and agent j's favorite alternative:
It is easy to verify that there exist welfare weights λ i (t) and λ j (t) that satisfy the inequalities in (24): If t i = 1 and t j = 0, any pair of weights with λ i (t)≥λ j (t) satisfies (24). If, instead, t i < 1 then any pair of weights with λ i (t)≥max{λ j (t),λ j (t)t j /(1− t i )} satisfies (24). In summary, if an ex post classically efficient decision rule f implements agent i's favorite alternative with probability 1 then: either t i ∈ [0,1) and t j ∈ [0,1]; or t i = 1 and t j = 0.
We now prepare the grounds for the proof of Proposition 6. The proof employs the results of three lemmas, each stating a property that any strategy-proof ex post classically efficient decision rule must display. The first lemma establishes that if the decision rule f assigns the compromise strictly positive probability for some interior type-pair above the cross-diagonal of the unit square T, then f must assign strictly positive and constant probabilities to alternatives a 1 and a 2 , resp., for all type-pairs below the cross-diagonal.
Lemma A.2 Let f be an ex post classically efficient and strategy-proof decision rule for some pair of strictly positive functions λ 1 (·) and λ 2 (·). If either f 0 (t ) > 0 for some type-pair t ∈ T, with t 1 +t 2 > 1 and t i < 1 for all i ∈ I, or f 0 (t ) ∈ (0,1) for some t ∈ T, with t 1 + t 2 > 1 and t i < 1 for at least one i ∈ I, then there exist numbersf 1 ∈ (0, 1) andf 2 = 1 − f 1 s.t. f 1 (t) =f 1 and f 2 (t) =f 2 = 1 −f 1 for all t ∈ T s.t. t 1 + t 2 < 1.
Proof of Lemma A.2. We distinguish the two cases listed in the lemma: Case 1. Fix a type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) s.t. t 1 + t 2 > 1 and t i < 1 for all i ∈ I. Suppose that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) > 0. By Lemma 3 there exists an agent j s.t. f j (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0 and f i (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 − f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) (i, j ∈ I, j = i). W.l.o.g. suppose that f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0 and f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 − f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ). Now consider the type-pairs (t 1 ,t 2 ) and (t 1 ,t 2 ) with 0 < t 2 < 1 − t 1 . By Lemma 3 we know that f assigns positive (but possibly zero) probability to alternatives a 1 and a 2 only. As f is strategy-proof, agent 2 of type t 2 cannot benefit from misrepresenting his type as t 2 :
Similarly, agent 2 of type t 2 cannot benefit from misrepresenting his type as t 2 :
By combining (25) and (26), it follows that, at type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ), f assigns alternative a 2 a probability f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) that is strictly between 0 and 1: 0 < f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )t 2 ≤ f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≤ f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )t 2 < 1, where f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) > 0. By Lemma 3, the remaining probability must be assigned to alternative 1:
Case 2. Fix a type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) s.t. t 1 + t 2 > 1 and t i < 1 for at least one agent i ∈ I. The only aspect of this case that is not already covered by Case 1 is where t i < 1 and t j = 1(i, j ∈ I, j = i). W.l.o.g. let t 2 = 1 and t 1 < 1. Suppose that f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 3, we know that f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 0 and f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 − f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ). Now consider the type-pairs (t 1 ,t 2 ) and (t 1 ,t 2 ) with 0 < t 2 < 1 − t 1 . Following the same incentive compatibility argument as in (25) and (26) of Case 1, it follows that, at type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ), f assigns alternative a 2 a probability f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) that is strictly between 0 and 1: 0 < f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )t 2 ≤ f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≤ f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 )t 2 < 1, where t 2 = 1 and f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 3, the remaining probability must be assigned to alternative 1:
The remainder of the proof applies to both Cases 1 and 2 above. Consider type-pairs (t 1 ,t 2 ) and (t 1 ,t 2 ), with t 1 + t 2 < 1. At (t 1 ,t 2 ) f assigns positive probability only to alternatives a 1 and a 2 . Strategy-proofness of f implies that agent 1 of type t 1 cannot benefit from misrepresenting his type as t 1 : u 1 (t 1 ,t 2 |t 1 ) ≥ u 1 (t 1 ,t 2 |t 1 ) ⇔ f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≥ f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ).
Similarly, agent 1 of type t 1 cannot benefit from misrepresenting his type as t 1 :
u 1 (t 1 ,t 2 |t 1 ) ≥ u 1 (t 1 ,t 2 |t 1 ) ⇔ f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≥ f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ).
By combining (27) and (28), we obtain: f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = 1 − f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) and f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = f 2 (t 1 ,t 2 ). Using the same logic, we can establish that f 1 (t 1 ,t 2 ) = Strategy-proofness requires furthermore that agent j of type t j cannot gain from pretending to be any type t j > t j , and vice versa: u j (t i ,t j |t j ) ≥ u j (t i ,t j |t j ) ⇔ f 0 (t i ,t j ) ≥ f 0 (t i ,t j ) for all t j > t j , and u j (t i ,t j |t j ) ≥ u j (t i ,t j |t j ) ⇔ f 0 (t i ,t j ) ≥ f 0 (t i ,t j ) for all t j > t j .
Together, these two incentive compatibility conditions imply: f 0 (t i ,t j ) = f 0 (t i ,t j ) for all t j > t j . Therefore, f prescribes the same probability distribution over {a 0 , a i } for all type-pairs (t i ,t j ) with t j ≥ t j .
Case 2. f 0 (t i ,t j ) ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, we have either f 0 (t i ,t j ) = f 0 (t i ,t j ) and f j (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ) > 0, or f 0 (t i ,t j ) > f 0 (t i ,t j ) and f j (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ) ≥ 0. In both of these sub-cases, the utility difference in (29) is strictly positive. This constitutes a contradiction to the premise that f is strategy-proof. Employing the same argument as in Case 1, we can conclude that f must prescribe the same probability distribution over {a 0 , a i } for all type-pairs (t i ,t j ) with t j ≥ t j .
Case 3. f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 1. In this case, by monotonicity in item (i) of Proposition 1, f 0 (t i ,t j ) = f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 1 and f j (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 0. This implies immediately that f prescribes the same degenerate probability distribution over A for all type-pairs (t i ,t j ) with t j ≥ t j .
Lemma A.4 Let f be an ex post classically efficient and strategy-proof decision rule for some pair of strictly positive functions λ 1 (·) and λ 2 (·). If there exists a typepair (t i ,t j ), with t i ,t j < 1 and t i + t j > 1 (i, j ∈ I, j = i), s.t. f i (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ), then f j (t i ,t j ) = 0 for all t i ∈ (1 − t j ,t i ).
Proof of Lemma A.4. By contradiction. Suppose there is a type-pair (t i ,t j ) with t i ,t j < 1 and t i + t j > 1, for which decision rule f assigns positive probability to alternatives a 0 and a i only: f 0 (t i ,t j ) ∈ [0, 1], f i (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ). Assume now that at some type-pair (t i ,t j ), with t i ∈ (1 − t j ,t i ), the decision rule f assigns strictly positive probability to alternative a j : f j (t i ,t j ) > 0. By Lemma 3 it must hold that f 0 (t i ,t j ) + f j (t i ,t j ) = 1. Now consider agent i of type t i . His utility from truthful revelation of his type is u i (t i ,t j |t i ) = f 0 (t i ,t j )t i . Suppose that agent i reports instead the type t i . This generates a utility of u i (t i ,t j |t i ) = f i (t i ,t j ) + f 0 (t i ,t j )t i .
The difference in agent i's utility between misrepresenting his type and truthful revelation of his type is: u i (t i ,t j |t i ) − u i (t i ,t j |t i ) = f i (t i ,t j ) + [ f 0 (t i ,t j ) − f 0 (t i ,t j )]t i = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ) + [ f 0 (t i ,t j ) − f 0 (t i ,t j )]t i .
Strategy-proofness requires that the utility difference in (30) be non-positive. By item (i) of Proposition 1, monotonicity of f 0 implies that f 0 (t i ,t j )≥f 0 (t i ,t j ). We now distinguish three cases: Case 1. f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 0. Monotonicity of f 0 implies that f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 0, and therefore the utility difference in (30) is strictly positive. This is a contradiction to the premise that f is strategy-proof.
Case 2. f 0 (t i ,t j ) ∈ (0,1). In this case, f i (t i ,t j ) = 1 − f 0 (t i ,t j ) > 0 and therefore the utility difference in (30) is strictly positive. This is a contradiction to the premise that f is strategy-proof.
Case 3. f 0 (t i ,t j ) = 1. In this case, the utility difference in (30) reduces to:
where the last equality follows from the opening assumption that f 0 (t i ,t j )+ f j (t i ,t j ) = 1 and f j (t i ,t j ) > 0. This, however, constitutes a contradiction to the premise that f is strategy-proof. As each of the three cases above leads to a contradiction we can conclude that f must prescribe a probability distribution over {a 0 ,a i } for all type-pairs (t i ,t j ) with t i ∈ (1 −t j ,t i ).
Proof of Proposition 6. We start from the premise that f is an ex post classically efficient decision rule. Assume furthermore that f is strategy-proof. Lemma 3 in conjunction with Proposition 3 implies that f cannot be a binary decision rule. Therefore, there exists a type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ T s.t. f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) ∈ (0,1). By Lemma 3 it must hold thatt 1 +t 2 ≥1 andt i < 1 for at least one agent i ∈ I (as f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) < 1 we cannot havet 1 =t 2 = 1). Due to the monotonicity of f 0 by item (i) of Proposition 1, we have f 0 (t 1 ,t 2 ) > 0 for all type-pairs (t 1 ,t 2 ) with t 1 ≥t 1 and t 2 ≥t 2 .
Step 1. Observe that regardless of whether the type-pair (t 1 ,t 2 ) is a point on the cross-diagonal (wheret 1 +t 2 = 1), a point in the interior of T (wheret 1 +t 2 > 1 andt i < 1 for all i ∈ I), or a boundary point (wheret i < 1 andt j = 1 for i, j ∈ I,
